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background
 
There is uncertainty about the mode of transmission of the severe acute respiratory syn-
drome (SARS) virus. We analyzed the temporal and spatial distributions of cases in a
large community outbreak of SARS in Hong Kong and examined the correlation of these
data with the three-dimensional spread of a virus-laden aerosol plume that was modeled
using studies of airflow dynamics.
 
methods
 
We determined the distribution of the initial 187 cases of SARS in the Amoy Gardens
housing complex in 2003 according to the date of onset and location of residence. We
then studied the association between the location (building, floor, and direction the
apartment unit faced) and the probability of infection using logistic regression. The
spread of the airborne, virus-laden aerosols generated by the index patient was modeled
with the use of airflow-dynamics studies, including studies performed with the use of
computational fluid-dynamics and multizone modeling.
 
results
 
The curves of the epidemic suggested a common source of the outbreak. All but 5 pa-
tients lived in seven buildings (A to G), and the index patient and more than half the
other patients with SARS (99 patients) lived in building E. Residents of the floors at the
middle and upper levels in building E were at a significantly higher risk than residents
on lower floors; this finding is consistent with a rising plume of contaminated warm air
in the air shaft generated from a middle-level apartment unit. The risks for the different
units matched the virus concentrations predicted with the use of multizone modeling.
The distribution of risk in buildings B, C, and D corresponded well with the three-dimen-
sional spread of virus-laden aerosols predicted with the use of computational fluid-
dynamics modeling.
 
conclusions
 
Airborne spread of the virus appears to explain this large community outbreak of SARS,
and future efforts at prevention and control must take into consideration the potential
for airborne spread of this virus.
abstract
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ong kong was the hardest-hit
 
area during the worldwide epidemic of
infection with the severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS) virus in 2003, with the highest in-
cidence rate (1755 cases in a population of 6.7 mil-
lion) and a high case fatality rate of 17 percent (299
deaths).
 
1
 
 In fact, the infection in Hong Kong was be-
lieved to be the source of the spread of the disease to
many other countries.
 
2
 
 A series of case clusters that
occurred during the epidemic in Hong Kong
 
2-6
 
 sug-
gested that environmental factors might have been
involved in the spread of the virus.
The large community outbreak in the Amoy Gar-
dens housing complex affected more than 300 resi-
dents of this private housing estate. The index pa-
tient infected with the SARS virus visited unit 7 on a
middle floor of building E on March 14 and again
on March 19 and used the toilet; the patient had di-
arrhea. Subsequent cases of SARS (categorized ac-
cording to apartment unit) were located in clusters
in four buildings and at certain floor levels.
 
6
 
 Previ-
ously available reports have not provided a satisfac-
tory explanation of the features of the outbreak in
the Amoy Gardens housing complex.
 
7-9
 
We analyzed the available data with reference to
the spatial distribution of the cases in this outbreak
and used models based on airflow dynamics to in-
vestigate the possibility of airborne transmission
of the SARS virus.
 
epidemiologic analysis
 
We studied data with regard to the date of onset of
symptoms and the location of the residences of the
persons with SARS virus infection in the initial
phase of the outbreak (most of these were probably
secondary cases). Residences were characterized ac-
cording to building (A through S, for a total of 19
buildings), floor (4th to 36th), and apartment unit
(apartment unit 1 to apartment unit 8, with eight
units on each floor). We then determined the distri-
bution of cases according to date of onset and loca-
tion of residence.
We used the probability of infection for each
apartment unit (not each resident) as the dependent
variable and applied the logistic-regression model
to explore the association between location (i.e.,
apartment unit and floor in each building) and the
probability of infection.
 
10
 
 Because each unit had two
bedrooms and all units were roughly equal in size,
we assumed that each unit housed four persons,
which was the largest number of infected persons
in any one unit in the data. The observed probability
of infection for an individual apartment unit could
therefore be 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, or 1. Because the air-
flow dynamics involved in the spread of the SARS
virus in building E (the suspected location of the
source of infection) were obviously different from
the dynamics in the other buildings, the analyses
for building E were performed separately from the
analyses for the other buildings.
The floors of the buildings were grouped into
three categories according to height (lower, middle,
and upper) so as to provide sufficient numbers for
analysis. The criteria for the cutoff points were cho-
sen to minimize the deviance in the logistic-regres-
sion models.
 
10
 
 Unit numbers (1 to 8) were recoded
to reflect the directions of the bedroom windows
(front facing) and living room windows (side fac-
ing) in every apartment unit (Fig. 1). In the resultant
eight directional codes (Ab, Ad, Ba, Bc, Cb, Cd, Da,
Dc, where A is southeast, B southwest, C northwest,
and D northeast) that were used in place of the eight
unit numbers, uppercase letters indicate the front-
facing window direction and lowercase letters in-
dicate the side-facing window direction. The lower
floors and apartment unit Cb were used as reference
categories in the regression analyses. To examine
the possibility of contamination of the analysis by
tertiary cases, we repeated the analyses after exclud-
ing late-onset cases and used different cutoff dates,
beginning with March 26. The fitted models were
compared with the use of the maximum rescaled
R
 
2
 
 and C statistics.
 
11-13
 
computational fluid-dynamics analysis 
and multizone modeling
 
A detailed site plan, floor plans, and the layout of the
drainage system in the Amoy Gardens complex were
obtained from the Buildings Department of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Hourly
meteorologic data for the area of Amoy Gardens
during March were obtained from the Hong Kong
Observatory.
Analysis with the use of computational fluid dy-
namics (CFD) allowed us to make a reasonably ac-
curate prediction of the detailed airflow pattern in
the air shafts (reentrant areas) and around the build-
ings in the housing complex. Similar airflow models
have been used for the study of foot-and-mouth dis-
ease
 
14
 
 and the Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak of
h
methods
Copyright © 2004 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved. 
Downloaded from www.nejm.org at UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG on January 28, 2007 . 
 n engl j med 
 
350;17
 
www.nejm.org april 
 
22, 2004
 
evidence of airborne transmission of sars
 
1733
 
1979.
 
15
 
 In the application of such a modeling tool,
turbulence models, numerical methods, and the us-
er’s experience can introduce substantial errors.
 
16
 
Hence, proper evaluation of the results is essential.
Two software packages were used for CFD, Fluent
(Fluent) and Airpak (Fluent). Fluent is a three-
dimensional, general-purpose CFD software pack-
age for modeling fluid flows.
 
17
 
 We used the basic-
renormalization-group (RNG) turbulence model
and the Reynolds stress model in Fluent to model
the effects of turbulence on airflow and the disper-
sion of pollutants. The virus-laden water droplets
generated from the apartment unit that the index
patient visited
 
6,7
 
 were found to evaporate rapidly
(after a few seconds in air) when we modeled the
virus-laden plume in the air shaft. For most of the
simulations, we approximated the droplet nuclei as
passive scalars, and the deposition effect was there-
fore neglected. Airpak is a three-dimensional CFD
software package that was developed for modeling
airflow in and around buildings.
 
18
 
 We used the
RNG turbulence model in Airpak to carry out CFD
simulations of both the plume flow in the air shaft
and the aerosol spread between buildings.
Multizone methods
 
19
 
 allowed us to calculate the
hourly rates of airflow between the apartment units
— also called zones for this calculation — and the
concentrations of virus-laden aerosols in each unit
in building E. These zones were connected by flow
paths, such as windows, doors, gaps around closed
 
Figure 1. Distribution of Cases of SARS Infection in Buildings A to G in the Amoy Gardens Housing Estate.
 
The prevailing wind (red arrows) during the period of possible exposure was northeasterly, or roughly perpendicular to 
the exterior walls of apartment units Dc and Da in building E. The distance between buildings E and B is 60 m. The direc-
tion from which the wind blew shifted from nearly north to east and even southeast. The red dot in building E indicates 
the unit that the index patient visited. The directional indicator for the units at the lower right-hand corner indicates the 
direction each unit faced. In the directional code (Ab, Ad, Ba, Bc, Cb, Cd, Da, Dc) used to designate an apartment unit, 
uppercase letters denote front-facing windows and lowercase letters side-facing windows.
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windows and doors, and elevator lobbies, to form a
flow network. For closed windows and doors, the
effective leakage area was calculated on the basis of
data from Orme et al.
 
20
 
 Flow rates through door-
ways and windows (closed and open) were assumed
to be dependent on differences in air pressure. Dif-
ferences in air temperature and winds, as well as the
exhaust from fans, could introduce driving pres-
sures. We used the software program MIX, which
was developed by Li et al.,
 
21
 
 to model the airflows
between apartment units in building E, on the as-
sumption that the contamination started from a
source inside the air shaft between units 7 and 8.
Adequate data for our analysis of the spread of the
SARS virus in Amoy Gardens were available for the
first 187 confirmed cases (involving persons in 142
apartment units) of a total of 321 cases (up to April
15, 2003) that were investigated by the Department
of Health
 
6
 
 and that accounted for approximately
70 percent of all cases that occurred on or before
April 1. The dates of onset of the first symptoms
are shown in Figure 2. The epidemic started on
March 21, 2003, and in the majority of cases among
residents in all buildings, the onset of symptoms oc-
curred during three days, March 24 to 26, with the
peak (mode) on March 24. The shape of the epidem-
ic curve was consistent with an outbreak with a com-
mon source. Data with reference to building E alone
produced a pattern very similar to that of the epi-
demic curve for all buildings, and the peak on March
24 was obvious. As shown in Figure 2, in building D,
the epidemic started on March 22 and also peaked
on March 24; in building C, it started on March 24
and peaked on March 26; and in building B, the
first cases occurred on March 23, and there was no
clear peak.
The floors in the buildings were categorized by
level as lower (floors 4 to 13), middle (floors 14 to
23), or upper (floors 24 to 36). All but 5 patients
with SARS (97 percent) lived in the seven buildings
(A to G) that form a ring (Fig. 1), and more than
half the cases (99) occurred in building E. In build-
ings A, F, and G, there were fewer than 10 cases
each, and hence those buildings were excluded from
further regression analyses. In buildings B, C, and
D, there were 20 to 25 cases each, and those build-
ings were included in the stratified analyses.
The fit was very similar in the different models
in which various cutoff dates were used for build-
ing E. The maximum rescaled R
 
2
 
 (the proportion
of variation explained by the model) ranged from
0.23 to 0.24, and the C statistic was between 0.80
and 0.82. The results of the logistic-regression mod-
els without cutoff dates are shown in Table 1. For
building E, apartment units (not persons) on the
middle and upper floors had higher probabilities
of infection than did units on lower floors, with an
odds ratio of 5.15 (95 percent confidence interval,
2.6 to 10.3; P<0.001) for the middle floors and 3.1
(95 percent confidence interval, 1.6 to 6.2; P<0.01)
for the upper floors. The risk of infection was high-
est (odds ratio, 14.5; 95 percent confidence inter-
val, 5.5 to 38.4) for units that faced direction Ab
(unit 8 on each floor), and it was also significantly
elevated in apartment units that faced direction
Ad (unit 7) (Table 1). The units that faced direc-
tions Da (unit 6) and Dc (unit 5) appeared to have a
slightly lower risk of infection than the other units.
Results of the test for heterogeneity were statisti-
cally significant (P<0.001) for both floor level and
direction.
For buildings B, C, and D, the variation among
the three categories of floor level was statistically
significant (P=0.01), but the variation among the
eight directions was of only borderline significance
(P=0.06). For middle-level floors and for directions
Ad, Ba, and Da there was a significantly higher risk
of infection than on the lower floors and in direc-
tion Cb, respectively. In the analyses stratified ac-
cording to building, only the model for building C
showed significant heterogeneity among floor lev-
els and directions. The odds ratios for the middle-
level floors (16.3) and for apartment units coded
Da (9.9) were statistically significant, whereas
those for the upper-level floors (7.2) and for units
coded Ad (6.4) were of borderline significance. Lo-
cation (floor level and direction) was not statisti-
cally significant for buildings B and D. However, in
building B, all apartment units with windows that
faced direction D (either at the front or the side) —
that is, the direction from which the wind blew from
building E — had high odds ratios, between 3.0
and 5.2; in building D, two directions the windows
faced were of borderline significance — namely, Ab
(odds ratio, 6.3) and Ba (odds ratio, 6.3). We re-
peated the modeling assuming five or six residents
in each unit and obtained similar results (data not
shown).
Figure 3 shows CFD modeling for the vertical
results
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movement of contaminated air in the air shaft be-
tween unit 7 (Ad) and unit 8 (Ab) in building E and
the three-dimensional spread of the viral plume to
buildings B, C, and D. Moist, warm air flowed from
the bathroom of the index unit (unit 7 in building E,
with windows facing direction Ad) and established
a plume in the air shaft that spread the airborne virus
upward. The predicted decay in the concentration
of the contaminated aerosols in the plume was 25
percent at the top of the air shaft where a northeast-
erly wind was blowing at the velocity of 2 m per sec-
ond. On reaching the top of the building, the con-
taminated air was carried by this northeasterly
wind toward other buildings. A substantial amount
of the contaminated air passed between buildings
C and D at the height of the middle-level floors.
The analysis performed with multizone methods
showed that horizontal airflows between apartment
units in building E, from unit 7 (Ad) and unit 8 (Ab)
toward units 1 to 6, were driven mainly by wind pres-
sure and by exhaust fans in the bathrooms or kitch-
ens in units 1 to 6 (Fig. 4). The “normalized” con-
 
Figure 2. Epidemic Curves for All Buildings and for Buildings B, C, D, and E.
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centration of the hypothetical infectious aerosols
was highest in units 7 and 8 (the referent) and low-
est in units 5 and 6.
Various hypotheses have been proposed to explain
the spread of the SARS virus in the Amoy Gardens
outbreak. The investigation by the government of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region sug-
gested that the index patient infected a small group
of residents in building E and that the infection sub-
sequently spread to the other residents in that build-
ing through the sewage-disposal system, person-to-
person contact, and the use of communal facilities
such as elevators and staircases. These infected res-
idents subsequently transmitted the disease to oth-
ers both within and outside building E through per-
son-to-person contact and by contaminating the
environment.
An investigative team from the World Health
Organization (WHO) found that traps in the floor
drains in many of the housing units seemed not to
have been filled with water for long periods; the
seals in the traps thus dried out, and as a result, a
connection was opened to the vertical soil stack
(drainage pipe).
 
7
 
 The investigative team suggested
that an exhaust fan that was running behind a closed
door in the bathroom could have drawn fine drop-
lets or aerosols from the soil stack into the bath-
room through the unsealed floor drain and thereby
contaminated the bathroom. The exhaust fan could
have transported contaminated droplets or aerosols
from the bathroom into the air shaft. These contam-
inated droplets or aerosols could have been carried
upward by the natural air current and could have
entered other apartment units, even units several
floors away from the source of infection, if the vi-
rus-laden aerosols had reached an open window.
The WHO report did not provide an explanation for
the spread of the infection from building E to the
other buildings.
We concur with the WHO hypothesis regarding
the source of infection and the mechanism of the
initial spread of the virus-contaminated aerosols.
With the use of a mock-up of the drainage system in
experimental studies at the Hydraulics Laboratory
of the University of Hong Kong, we found that huge
numbers of aerosols were generated by the hydrau-
lic action in vertical soil stacks when toilets were
flushed. The drainage pipes for various units within
a single building were not directly connected, and
the drainage pipes for all the buildings were not
connected until they met underground. Hence,
the spread of infection through the sewage system,
which was suggested in the government’s report,
could explain only cases that developed in unit 7 of
building E but not cases that developed in other
units in that building and in other buildings.
Cases of infection began to occur in buildings
B, C, and D only one to three days after the first cases
occurred in building E. In the majority of the cases
in buildings C and D, the first symptoms appeared
within a period of three days (March 24 to 26), co-
inciding with the peak of the epidemic in building E.
This finding suggested that these cases were more
likely to have developed from exposure to a common
source than from person-to-person contact, as was
suggested in the government report.
 
6
 
 Riley et al.
discussion
 
* Risk was calculated as the number of cases divided by the assumed number 
of residents.
† The odds ratios for the risk of infection with the SARS virus at different floor 
levels compare middle and upper levels with lower levels (the reference cate-
gory). The odds ratios for the risk of infection with windows facing various di-
rections are compared with units facing direction Cb (the reference category). 
CI denotes confidence interval.
‡ Floors were categorized according to level as lower (floors 4 to 13), middle 
(floors 14 to 23), and upper (floors 24 to 36).
§ P<0.001.
¶ P<0.01.
¿ Directions were coded on the basis of the directions each unit faced. Upper-
case letters denote front-facing windows and lower-case letters side-facing 
windows.
 
**P<0.05.
 
Table 1. Location as a Risk Factor for Infection with the SARS Virus 
among Residents of Housing Units in Amoy Gardens.
Location Building E Buildings B, C, and D
 
Risk*
Odds Ratio 
(95% CI)† Risk*
Odds Ratio 
(95% CI)†
 
no./total 
no.
no./total 
no.
 
Floor‡
Lower 12/320 1.00 11/960 1.00
Middle 46/320 5.15 (2.58–10.29)§ 30/960 2.80 (1.39–5.62)¶
Upper 41/416 3.12 (1.57–6.22)¶ 25/1248 1.77 (0.86–3.61)
Direction¿
Cb 5/132 1.00 2/396 1.00
Ab 45/132 14.49 (5.46–38.44)§ 8/396 4.07 (0.86–19.30)
Ad 17/132 3.86 (1.37–10.88)** 11/396 5.65 (1.24–25.66)**
Ba 8/132 1.65 (0.52–5.22) 12/396 6.18 (1.37–27.81)**
Bc 9/132 1.88 (0.61–5.79) 5/396 2.52 (0.49–13.08)
Cd 9/132 1.88 (0.61–5.79) 5/396 2.52 (0.49–13.08)
Da 4/132 0.79 (0.21–3.04) 15/396 7.79 (1.77–34.33)**
Dc 2/132 0.39 (0.07–2.05) 8/396 4.07 (0.86–19.30)
Copyright © 2004 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved. 
Downloaded from www.nejm.org at UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG on January 28, 2007 . 
 n engl j med 
 
350;17
 
www.nejm.org april 
 
22, 2004
 
evidence of airborne transmission of sars
 
1737
 
showed that the persons who became ill in the out-
break were likely to have been infected during a very
short period (±1 day) around March 19, 2003.
 
22
 
 Our
analysis also showed that the peak exposure would
have occurred on approximately March 19 and 20,
if a modal incubation period of about four to five
days was assumed.
 
23
 
 
Members of the management and security staff
of Amoy Gardens, who worked on the ground floor
in each building 24 hours a day and would probably
have had frequent person-to-person contact with
the residents, were not affected by the virus. Like-
wise, there were no cases reported among staff
members in the large shopping center in the Amoy
Gardens estate. The spatial distribution of the affect-
ed apartment units (in which there were cases of in-
fection) could not be explained by random person-
to-person contact. We believe that such contact
probably occurred in the latter part of the epidemic
and that the number of cases and therefore the num-
ber of units affected by this means was likely to have
been small.
Ng put forward the theory that roof rats were
both amplifiers and distributors of the SARS-asso-
ciated coronavirus,
 
9
 
 but this theory is not support-
ed by the epidemiologic distribution of cases; the
middle-level floors were affected more than the up-
per floors, and certain units were affected more than
others in the same building. Roof rats are by nature
territorial, and they therefore could not be respon-
sible for the rapid and efficient spread of the infec-
tion from a single building, building E, to other
buildings. The main flaw in this hypothesis is that
it does not explain the steep decline in the epidemic
curve after the peak, because there was no sudden
disappearance of roof rats or massive deaths
among them.
The epidemic curve supports the hypothesis of a
common source of the outbreak in Amoy Gardens,
and the spatial distribution of the cases conformed
to the hypothesis that virus-laden aerosols spread
from a single source (the index apartment unit), as
shown in our model made with the use of airflow-
dynamics data. The delay of one to three days in the
onset of the epidemic in buildings B, C, and D
might be explained by a lower effective viral load in
the aerosols as the plume became progressively di-
luted. A delay in the onset of symptoms was also ob-
served among cases in the apartment units of build-
ing E that did not border the index air shaft. With
regard to cases with an onset of symptoms within
the first three days of the outbreak, all except one
occurred in unit 7 (Ad) and unit 8 (Ab), which lined
the air shaft nearest the index unit. The predomi-
nant direction of the wind blowing from unit 7 to-
ward unit 8 could explain why residents in unit 8 on
 
Figure 3. Model of the Movement of the Virus-Laden Plume.
 
According to our computational fluid-dynamics modeling, the buoyant plume (blue) rose from the air shaft between two 
housing units in building E (yellow) and was carried by a northeasterly wind toward the middle-level floors in buildings 
C and D. The L-shape structure (Panels A and B) was a nearby construction site that blocked the wind flowing toward 
lower-level floors in buildings E, C, and D. The wake flow of the construction site created a region of negative air pressure 
in the space between buildings E, C, and D (Panel B) that caused the plume to bend downward, toward buildings C and D.
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the various floors were more affected than those in
unit 7.
The dilution of the viral load as the plume trav-
eled upward might explain why residents on the
middle floors were more affected than those on the
upper floors. In apartment unit 5 (Dc) and unit 6
(Da) there were fewer cases of infection, because
these units were upwind of the index air shaft and
therefore received the lowest normalized viral con-
centrations. The unit directions (i.e., the directions
the front and side windows faced) and floor levels
that were associated with higher risk in buildings C
and D corresponded well to the results of the air-
flow modeling, which showed the contaminated
plume passing through the space between build-
ings C and D at middle-level floors. For building B,
apartment units that faced building E appeared to
have a higher risk of infection.
The extremely high concentrations of the SARS-
associated coronavirus found in the feces and urine
of the index patient, coupled with the aerosolization
due to hydraulic action inside the drainage pipes
(vertical soil stacks), most likely generated huge
numbers of virus-laden aerosols. The concentration
of the aerosols decayed as the plume traveled away
from the source, and the decay corresponded to
lower attack rates (and, possibly, to a longer incu-
bation period) in other apartment units of building
E and in other buildings. The concentration of virus
in respiratory secretions was found to be much low-
er than the concentrations in urine and stool, and
this difference might explain the need for close con-
tact with the index cases in some nosocomial out-
breaks of SARS.
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In summary, our epidemiologic analysis, exper-
imental studies, and airflow simulations support
the probability of an airborne spread of the SARS
virus in the outbreak in Amoy Gardens. Virus-laden
aerosols generated in the vertical soil stack of unit
7 in building E returned to the bathroom through
the dried-up seals of the floor-drain traps and then
entered the air shaft, probably by means of suction
created by an exhaust fan. The aerosols moved up-
ward owing to the buoyancy of the warm, humid air
within the air shaft and could enter apartment units
that bordered the air shaft on the upper floors be-
cause of the negative pressure created by the exhaust
fans or the action of wind flows around the building.
The horizontal spread of infection to other units in
building E was by movement of the air between
apartment units. After the plume reached the top of
the air shaft in building E, the virus was spread to
some units at certain heights in buildings B, C, and
D by the action of a predominant northeasterly wind.
Our hypothesis adequately explains the tempo-
ral and spatial distribution of cases of SARS. This
hypothesis remains to be confirmed by further an-
alytic epidemiologic, environmental, and experi-
mental studies and should have important public
health implications for the prevention and control
of SARS, should the disease recur.
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